Abstract: There has been substantial research on both asset restructuring and top management changes. The connection between the two, however, has received little attention. Here, we examine spinoffs as events through which top management is restructured. Our main findings are: 1) both firm-specific human capital and more general human capital, such as governance expertise and top management experience, affect the composition of spinoff firms' top management, 2) the structure of spinoff top management is related to the value created by a spinoff, and 3) for a subsample of firms, spinoffs serve as a form of management dismissal, with the opportunity to manage a smaller, weaker spinoff firm serving as a "consolation prize."
Introduction
To date, there has been substantial research on both asset restructuring and top management changes. The connection between the two, however, has received little attention. Yet, we suspect that as a part of many major asset restructurings, top management is restructured as well. In this study, we examine corporate spinoffs as events through which top management is restructured.
While past work has established improved performance following spinoffs in general, there is a great deal of cross-sectional variation in both the stock price response to spinoff announcements and posttransaction performance. In fact, as we show later many spinoffs are not positively received by the market at announcement and do not demonstrate strong performance afterwards. This suggests that the way in which top management is restructured (or not) helps explain the value created (or not) by these transactions. This also suggests that firm-specific human capital and governance and top management expertise influence the composition of spinoff firms' top management teams.
Because spinoffs quickly and dramatically restructure assets and potentially top management, they provide a unique opportunity to study the link between the two. In a spinoff transaction, a parent firm's assets are divided between two (and sometimes more) corporations. Each corporation is a separate public company. Shares of the "new" company(ies) are distributed directly to parent firm shareholders. Most spinoffs are structured as a tax-free return of capital to shareholders. To qualify for tax-free status, the parent firm cannot hold more than 20% of the voting stock in the new companies. Thus, the typical parent firm does not control the equity of the new spinoff firm.
In addition, the parent and spinoff(s) must have had a business relationship for at least five years to qualify for tax-free status. The longevity of the relation between parent and spinoff implies that a well-established management structure is being discarded. On the surface, it might appear that spinoff transactions simply move the assets and managers of one division of a multi-divisional parent outside the boundary of that firm. We find, however, that the restructuring of top management that accompanies spinoffs is more complex. In fact, it is very unusual for a spinoff top management team to be comprised solely of former division managers. Our analysis focuses on the composition of the spinoff firm's top management team, which we define as the individual or two individuals that hold a combination of the chairman, CEO and president titles. 1 We find that 20.8% of spinoff top managers are outsiders (as defined later). Of the insiders (managers from the former parent firm) involved in spinoff top management, 48.2% are top managers rather than division heads or other lower level managers. Finally, although the transaction separates the parent and spinoff firm in a control sense, it does not always separate the management of the two. In 33.7% of our sample spinoffs, there is an overlap in top management between the parent and spinoff firm following the transaction.
Our evidence shows that both firm-specific human capital and expertise in corporate governance are important considerations in structuring the top management team of a spinoff firm. In a multidivisional firm, division managers need not possess expertise in corporate governance. Governance expertise can be concentrated at the top of the organization. When the division becomes publicly traded, however, governance expertise is required. Since many divisional managers are unlikely to possess such expertise, we hypothesize that individuals with that expertise will be recruited. This raises the related issue of the intensity and effectiveness of corporate governance for both firms.
Prior to a spinoff, a single board of directors governs the management of all the parent firm's assets.
Following a spinoff, the same assets are governed by two boards. If the new governance is effective, it provides a potentially important, but often overlooked, source of value creation in spinoff transactions. 1 We do not present evidence on the parent firms' top management teams. Exploratory data collection revealed that there is little, if any, substantive change in parent firms' top management in the year following the spinoff. The exceptions are cases in which parent firm top managers become part the spinoff firm's top management and we capture these by studying spinoff firm top management. We analyze the importance of firm-specific human capital and governance expertise in two ways. First, we examine how spinoff firms combine inside and outside managers, and governance and operating expertise, using data on each manager's prior employment. We find most outsiders are teamed with insiders on two person top management teams. This is consistent with the hypothesis that it is important to combine the skills, perspective and governance expertise provided by outsiders with the firm-specific human capital supplied by insiders.
In addition, we find that former division heads generally hold a top operating position, such as president or CEO, rather than the title of chairman of the board. In addition, spinoffs with division heads as top managers are more likely to have parent firm representatives on their board of directors. This is consistent with the hypothesis that, due to a lack of expertise in corporate governance, division managers are less likely to serve as chairman than top insiders or outsiders. We also find that post-transaction management overlaps between parent and spinoff firms have a governance, rather than an operating, orientation. Potentially, this allows valuable firm-specific human capital and governance expertise to be utilized across the firms without burdening a single top manager with day-to-day responsibility for two publicly traded firms.
Second, we examine measures of the importance of firm-specific human capital based on the characteristics of the spinoff. We find that outsiders are more often involved in spinoffs where the parent and spinoff firms are in different industries, and in situations where the profitability of these industries differs. In addition, results of a multinomial logit regression show that the probability of selecting an outsider as a spinoff top manager is significantly negatively associated with the parent firm's pre-spinoff industry-adjusted profitability. This is the only category of spinoff top manager for which this is the case. Poor profitability suggests that the human capital of parent firm managers is not highly valuable in managing the spinoff firm. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that outsiders are more likely to be appointed when parent firm managers lack the human capital or expertise to effectively manage the spinoff firm. Regarding management overlap, multinomial logit analysis reveals that spinoffs with a top manager straddling both firms comprise the only group that is negatively associated with a measure of industry homogeneity. When spinoff industry homogeneity is high, a parent firm can more accurately assess a spinoff's potential and the quality of its management team. Thus, the value of establishing an overlapping management structure, for example, to monitor and influence posttransaction decision-making, is relatively low. In addition, we find that spinoffs with straddling managers are relatively large. If larger firms pose complex management problems, then management overlap is more likely to be valuable.
Cross-sectional regressions show that the value created at the announcement of a spinoff is significantly associated with the characteristics of the spinoff firm's top management team. This finding persists after controlling for the relative size of the spinoff and whether or not the spinoff and parent firm are in the same industry -elements found to be related to value creation in prior work. Most interesting is the fact that spinoffs in which a top manager from the parent firm "jumps ship" to join spinoff top management are strongly positively received by the market. The positive effect is even stronger when the spinoff firm has a management team that combines a parent firm top manager jumping ship with a division head-a team that combines firm-specific knowledge with governance expertise.
The above findings raise the question of whether manages who leave the parent firm to join the spinoff are in some sense being dismissed. If some spinoffs are a mechanism for management dismissal, we predict that relatively weak assets will be allocated to these firms. To examine this issue, we compare the pre-spinoff profitability and valuation of the parent firm with an "as-if" firm constructed using a weighted average of parent and spinoff firm data after the transaction. We then examine the performance of parent and spinoff firms separately. In the two years prior to the spinoff, parent firms exhibit strong profitability relative to their industry, but are valued at a discount relative to a benchmark of their industry peers. This combination is consistent with poor internal resource allocation (Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein (2000) ) and the agency problems of free cash (Jensen (1986) ). Relative to the pre-spinoff parent, the "as-if" firm has similar profitability but suffers less of a valuation discount. Thus, we find that the valuation of assets improves on average following a spinoff.
Examining parent and spinoff firms separately shows that the valuation increase for the "as-if" firm is entirely attributable to parent firms. Indeed, following the transaction, parent firms are valued similarly to their industry peers. In contrast, spinoff firms are valued 22% below their industry peers on average-a discount larger than that suffered by the parent firm prior to the transaction. Clearly, spinoffs are structured in a way that allocates the weaker assets to the new firm, presumably posing a great challenge to spinoff firm managers. Interestingly, spinoff firms managed by managers who leave the parent firm are discounted more than other spinoffs. Spinoffs whose top management involves a division head suffer a valuation discount of -20% relative to industry peers.
Spinoffs managed by "jumpers" are valued 28% less than their industry-the largest of any top manager classification. This evidence suggests that some spinoffs serve as a mechanism for management dismissal, with the opportunity to manage a weaker set of assets serving as a "consolation prize" for managers leaving the parent firm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our sample selection method and descriptive statistics. Section 3 briefly reviews the literature, and develops and tests hypotheses about the composition of spinoff firms' top management. Section 4 develops and tests hypotheses about the relation between value created at announcement and the composition of spinoff firms' top management. In section 5, multinomial logit analysis is used to analyze the relation between parent firm performance, transaction characteristics and the structure of spinoff top management. Section 6 presents evidence on spinoff firms' ownership and governance structure. Section 7 presents evidence on post-spinoff profitability and valuation, and relates this evidence to the possibility that some spinoffs serve as a form of management dismissal. Section 8 concludes. because: there was not sufficient information to verify completion, the percentage spun off was less than 80%, the spinoff firm already had publicly traded stock, the parent firm was not a public company, or the spinoff was mandated by a regulatory agency.
Of the 193 remaining transactions, we retain those where data on the structure of the spinoff top management team are available. We utilize the following sources to collect these data: parent and spinoff firm proxy statements, parent and spinoff firm annual reports, Dow Jones On-Line Publications, Lotus One Source and Lexis/Nexis. Lack of management data reduces our sample by 21 firms to 172 spinoff transactions.
Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in table 1. As the table shows, the number of spinoffs varies across years, with a low of four transactions in 1991 and a high of twenty transactions in 1994. The differences across years, however, are not statistically significant. We find no evidence of clustering in particular standard industrial classification (SIC) codes for either parent or spinoff firms (details not reported). The size of the spinoff firm relative to the parent firm in our sample is typical of that found in other studies. At the mean (median) spinoff value is 33.3% (20.7%) of the parent firm's value measured prior to the transaction. The mean and median of spinoff value relative to parent value varies across years, but again the differences are not statistically significant. measures of parent firm performance and valuation prior to the spinoff's announcement. Overall, the evidence indicates that parent firms undertake spinoffs to improve performance. The reasons most commonly reported for a spinoff are to strengthen strategy, as part of an on-going effort to restructur the parent firm, and to spin off a poorly performing business unit.
Prior to the spinoff announcement, parent firms have significant, positive industry-adjusted operating profit as a fraction of total assets (0.054). In contrast, industry-adjusted market-to-book is significant and negative at -0.176. Valuation relative to a benchmark based on the valuation of pure play firms in the same industries reveals a discount of over 13%.
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The magnitude of the discounts for parent firms in our sample lies between the median discount for multi-segment firms of -0.106 and the median discount of -0.318 for diversified firms that become takeover targets (Berger/Ofek (1995) , Berger/Ofek (1996)).
The above suggests that, prior to the spinoff, the management problems of parent firms are more severe than those of the typical diversified firm, but less severe than those of firms that become takeover targets. As mentioned previously, a strongly profitable firm with weak valuation is indicative of poor internal resource allocation (Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein (2000) ) and the 2 Valuation discount or premium is computed following Berger/Ofek (1995) by taking the natural log of the ratio of the firm's actual value to a pure play benchmark value. Firm value is defined as the sum of the book value of debt, the book value of preferred stock and the market value of common stock. The pure play benchmark is computed by taking the median firm value to sales ratio for all single segment Compustat firms by four-digit SIC code. These medians are then matched to parent firms' segment data by SIC code. The matched median industry ratio is multiplied by parent firm segment sales or assets. These products are then summed across segments to obtain the pure play benchmark. We require five industry members for each SIC code, so if there is not a five member industry match at the four-digit level, we move to the three-digit level and so on. In addition, following the Berger/Ofek (1995) method, we eliminate all outliers (defined as firms whose excess value measure is greater than 1.386 or less than -1.386 which implies an excess value four times greater or smaller than actual value). We also check to see whether the sum of segment sales or assets for the parent firm is within 25% of total sales. If it is not, following Berger/Ofek (1995) we adjust the pure play benchmark up or down in accordance with the percentage difference. Industry-adjusted market-to-book value and profitability are computed analogously to the Berger/Ofek measure, except that we subtract the pure play benchmark from the actual rather than taking the natural log of the ratio. Schoar (1999) who finds that diversified firms are more productive at the plant level than undiversified firms, yet at the same time trade at significant discounts relative to pure plays. Table 3 presents evidence on parent firm ownership structure around the time of the spinoff.
Data are from Compact Disclosure. The table shows the percentage of insider and outsider ownership for years -1 through 2 relative to the spinoff announcement year. It also shows whether or not a significant change in ownership structure occurs from one year to the next.
From year -1 to 0, there is a significant increase in outside blockholder ownership that persists at least through year 2. The magnitude and significance of the increase in outside blockholder ownership obtains even when the parent firms of spinoffs undertaken to fend off hostile takeovers (where we expect outside block ownership to increase) are removed. These findings suggest that pressure from new outside blockholders encourages some managers to undertake a spinoff. There is no significant change in insider ownership over time.
Corporate spinoffs and management restructuring
No study of which we are aware examines corporate spinoffs as events through which top management is restructured. Below we briefly summarize some of the relevant literature on spinoffs and top management changes. Drawing on this literature, we develop hypotheses regarding the characteristics of spinoff firm top management, and the relation between the characteristics of top management and the value created by spinoffs.
Numerous event studies establish that stock prices respond positively to the announcement of a spinoff.
3 Researchers hypothesize that the value created at announcement is due, at least in part, to the market's assessment that the firm's assets will be managed more efficiently. Indeed, past studies 3
The average stock price response to spinoff announcements is uniformly positive and significant. Across the many event studies of spinoffs we reviewed, estimates of two-day announcement-period abnormal returns range from 1.3% to 5.6% (Slovin, Sushka and Ferraro (1995) and Rosenfeld (1984) , respectively). (1997) show that operating profit improves for parent firms after a spinoff. Desai and Jain (1999) find that spinoffs that increase corporate focus are followed by improved operating profit and significant, positive long-run stock price performance. Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1993) find an unusually high level of takeover activity for both parent and spinoff firms following a spinoff. Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein (2000) find evidence of more efficient internal capital markets following spinoff transactions.
While past work has established improved performance following spinoffs in general, there is a great deal of cross-sectional variation in both the stock price response to spinoff announcements and post-transaction performance. In fact, many spinoffs are not positively received by the market at announcement and do not demonstrate strong performance afterwards. We hypothesize that the way in which the top management is restructured (or not) will help explain the value created (or not) by the transaction.
Changes in top management have also been extensively studied. Overall, the evidence indicates that top managers are disciplined for poor performance, at least in part, through loss of job.
Specifically, top management turnover is more likely following poor stock price performance and also following poor accounting performance (Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) and Weisbach (1988) ). In addition, researchers document increased top management turnover following a variety of events and corporate control transactions. For example, Martin and McConnell (1991) find a high rate of top management turnover after successful tender offers. Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) present a similar finding for firms in financial distress. Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) find that decreases in corporate diversification are followed by an unusually high frequency of both external control threats and top management turnover.
Recently, researchers have begun to study how managers are selected rather than the factors associated with their dismissal. One example is Parrino's (1997) plays a critical role; for firms in industries with relatively homogenous assets, poorly performing top managers are both easier to identify and more likely to be replaced by outsiders. That is, the pool of substitute top managers will be greater in industries characterized by relatively greater homogeneity.
We hypothesize that the value of firm-specific human capital, governance expertise and industry homogeneity will affect the composition of a spinoff firm's top management team.
Assembling a new top management team
After a parent firm splits into two or more entities, the top management team of the parent is responsible for a smaller organization -a relatively benign change in terms of the challenges posed to top management. In contrast, the spinoff entity moves from being a division that reports to corporate headquarters to a free standing public company with its own board of directors. A critical decision, therefore, that must be made when undertaking a spinoff is determining the top management team of the spinoff.
Perhaps the most obvious choice to head up the spinoff are the incumbent managers of the division to be spun off. The set of abilities and skills required for success as a division manager or lower-level executive, however, are likely different from those required for success as the top manager of a publicly traded company. In particular, many division managers will lack governance expertise and other skills required to manage a public company. Consider, for example, the following items that pose a challenge to spinoff firms' top managers:
• Rather than being "governed" by and reporting to headquarters staff, the top manager of a spun off business is governed by and reports to a board of directors elected by shareholders, • Rather than becoming skilled at requesting resources from headquarters through an internal capital market, the top manager must raise funds externally, • Rather than being constrained by, or subjected to, the internal control systems and policies of the parent corporation, the top manager can choose a set of systems and practices that best suit the purposes of the newly independent company, and • Rather than relying on (providing) cross-subsidization from (to) other business units in hard times, the company must be organized and managed to be self-sufficient, which requires developing capital acquisition and/or payout policies.
As an example, Hambrick and Stucker (1999) report the following based on their field research on spinoffs, "We spoke with one CEO appointed after the board ousted his predecessor, who had overseen a two-year halving of the spinoff's stock value. The previous CEO, who had been generally effective as divisional manager, was vastly underprepared for the complexities of leading a publicly traded corporation. He badly mismanaged relations with the company's investors and creditors; and, with no experience in dealing with a board of directors, he withheld critical information that might have allowed some important corrections. Eventually the banks turned off the faucets, the board became fully apprised of the situation, and the new CEO was brought in to try to save the company."
In summary, while divisional and other lower-level executives are possible choices for top management slots at the spinoff, it is not clear that they are always the optimal choice to manage the newly created entity. On the one hand, their experience with managing this particular set of assets makes them a sensible choice in terms of firm-specific human capital. On the other hand, the lack of governance expertise and top management experience argues for the appointment of an incumbent top manager or managers. Alternatively, if the assets are not well managed as part of the parent firm, talent from outside the firm might be required. An outside appointment, however, forgoes the value of firm-specific human capital (unless the outsider is teamed with an insider). This discussion leads us to the following hypotheses regarding the structure of the spinoff firm's top management team:
• Due to lack of governance expertise and top management experience, a division manager is less likely to hold the title of spinoff firm chairman than a parent top manager who joins the spinoff firm or an outsider, • Where firm-specific human capital is less valuable, it is more likely that an outsider will be appointed to the top management team, • Where firm-specific human capital is more valuable, it is more likely that an outside top manager will be teamed with an insider, and • Where firm-specific human capital is more valuable, it is more likely that the parent and spinoff firm will have an overlap in their top management teams.
As we report below, descriptive evidence on the composition of spinoff firm's top management teams is consistent with all four of these hypotheses. Tables 4 and 5 provide new evidence on the composition of spinoff firms' top management teams. 4 We do not present evidence on the parent firms' top management teams. This is because an exploratory data collection effort revealed that there is little, if any, substantive change in parent firms' top management in the year following the spinoff. 5 The exceptions are cases in which parent firm top managers become part the spinoff firm's top management. These exceptions are, of course, identified and studied through data on spinoff firms' top management. Table 4 presents evidence on the positions spinoff top managers held before they joined the spinoff firm. We define the spinoff top management team as the one or two individuals holding a combination of the titles chairman of the board (chairman), chief executive officer (CEO), and president. This provides us with a sample of 298 spinoff executives employed by 172 spinoff firms.
Insiders and outsiders
Panel A presents the breakdown between "insiders" and "outsiders" for all spinoff executives and for executives by the structure of the spinoff firm's top management team.
Over 76% of spinoff executives are employed by the parent firm for three years or longer prior to the spinoff announcement. We call these individuals "insiders." A smaller percentage of top managers, 20.8%, came to the spinoff firm from another firm or have served as a parent firm manager for fewer than three years. We call these individuals "outsiders." Seward and Walsh (1996) present some evidence on the prior employment of spinoff firm's CEO, their board composition and whether or not spinoff firms use stock-based compensation. They find no significant relation between the governance and control practices of spinoff firms and announcement period stock returns. In contrast, by providing a more detailed analysis of management succession we are able to document significant relations (see their table V) .
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An extended sample of parent firms brought forward to the present might reveal an increase in parent management changes but is left here as an avenue for future research.
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Even given our definition, our percentage of outsiders is only slightly higher than the percentage of outside CEO appointments found in studies of CEO succession (Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988), Parrino (1997) ). It is also similar to the percentage of outside CEOs appointed in spinoffs (16%) documented by Seward and Walsh (1996) .
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October 2001 Eric G. Wruck and Karen H. Wruck 13 extremely rare for an individual to join the spinoff firm's top management days or even weeks prior to the transaction. Our reading of press and firm reports indicates that spinoffs are often planned in advance and that this planning includes lining up managers to run the new firm. Managers with short tenure at the parent firm seem, therefore, to be more appropriately viewed as drawn from the external, rather than internal, labor market.
As table 4, panel A shows, spinoff firms adopt three different structures for their top management teams. The first structure, adopted by 26.7% (46 of 172) of the firms, is a team where one person holds both the chairman and CEO or CEO/president titles. The second, and most popular structure, is a two person team in which distinct individuals hold the chairman and top manager titles. This structure is adopted by 48.3% (83 of 172) of the spinoffs. The third structure, adopted by 25% (43 of 172) of spinoff firms, is a two person team where one individual holds the combined titles Chairman/CEO and another individual is president. Outsiders are relatively uncommon in this final structure, representing only 7% of Chairman/CEOs in this group, and only 18.6% of presidents. In contrast, outsiders represent 21.7% of managers on one person teams, and 26.5% of chairmen and 22.9% of top managers in the second management team structure. Thus, when outsiders are brought in as part of a two person team, they are rarely given both the chairmanship and the top management job. Consistent with our hypotheses, this suggests that it is important to pool the firmspecific human capital supplied by insiders with the skills and perspective provided by outsiders.
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Panel B of table 4 shows the titles held by insiders at the parent firm prior to the spinoff. It is common to think of spinoff firms as being managed by their former division head (e.g., Aron (1991)). In fact, only slightly more than half of top managers with long tenure at the parent held 7 It is worth noting that the fact that 48.3% of spinoff firms separate the titles of chairman and CEO is unusual relative to a sample of public firms in cross-section. For example, Yermack (1996) finds that 17% of the public companies separate the two titles. Similarly, Khurana (1998) reports that 15% of his sample firms separate the chairman and CEO title. The separation of these positions has been advocated as a way to strengthen corporate governance (e.g., Jensen (1993) ). This is perhaps more surprising because our sample firms are smaller than the firms examined in these studies. The small size of our firms might lead one to expect them to be more likely to combine titles than larger firms. This would be the case, for example, if smaller firms are simpler to manage and therefore require a smaller management team or less top management were chairmen or top managers at the parent.
Of particular interest is the fact that former division heads and other lower level executives are more likely to hold a top operating manager title, such as CEO or president, than to be chairman of the board. Of the 118 division heads involved in spinoff top management, only 44 or 37% hold the title of chairman. In contrast, of the 110 top insiders, 87 or 79% hold the chairman title, as do 35 of the 62 outsiders (56%). This is consistent with our hypothesis that, due to a lack of governance and top management expertise, division managers are less likely to hold the title of spinoff chairman than top insiders and outsiders. There are two types of straddling positions. In the most common, a top manager holds a governance-oriented position at both firms. This governance-oriented overlap occurs in 57 of the 58 cases where parent and spinoff firm top management overlap. In the other type, the top manager holds an operating position (top manager) at both firms and a governance position (chairman) at the other firm. This occurs in 16 spinoff firms: 27% of straddlers and 9.3% of all spinoff firms.
The composition of top management in spinoff firms
The fact that management overlap tends to have a governance orientation, rather than an operating orientation, is consistent with the efficient utilization of firm-specific human capital.
When there is valuable firm-specific human capital at the parent firm regarding the spinoff and vice versa, a governance-oriented relationship can allow that capital to be utilized without burdening a single top manager with responsibility for the day-to-day operations of two publicly traded firms.
Another possibility is that management overlap is simply a transitional measure rather than an indication of the ongoing value of firm-specific human capital. To address this possibility, we follow spinoff management teams with overlap for up to 3 years following completion. Only 33% of these firms report that the overlap is part of a transition plan. Three years later, only one-third of this 33% had actually changed one or both top executives. All the remaining firms had the same top executives three years later. Thus, for most firms the observed management overlap is not transitory.
As panel A also shows, not only do parent firm top managers play a role at the spinoff firm, many of them "jump ship," leaving the parent firm for a top management position at the spinoff.
Of the spinoff firms, 38 or 22.1% have at least one top manager who "jumped ship" from the parent firm. Finally, 56.4% of spinoff firms have a former division or lower level manager as part of their top management teams. show where the intersections between categories occur. The figure can be read in a fashion similar to a correlation matrix. Along the main diagonal (gray shaded and heavily outlined boxes) are the management teams whose members fall into only one of four categories (both one and two person teams). On the off-diagonals, are the management teams whose members fall into different categories (two person teams only).
Testing hypotheses about top management team composition and firm-specific human capital
Recall that we hypothesize that when firm-specific human capital is relatively valuable, it is less likely that an outsider will be appointed to the top management team. We also hypothesize that when firm-specific human capital is relatively valuable, it is more likely that the parent and spinoff firm will have an overlap in their top management teams. We use three proxies for the value of firm-specific human capital to test our hypotheses. Below we define each proxy and explain how it is related to the value of firm-specific human capital.
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Note that since a single manager can fall into only one category and each spinoff firm has at most two top managers, there can only be two-way intersections between categories. The more homogeneous the industry (the higher the index), the less valuable is firm-specific human capital, • Cross industry spinoff: Whether the parent and spinoff firms operate in the same 4-digit SIC code. When parent and spinoff firms operate in the same industry, top insiders are more likely to possess valuable firm-specific human capital relevant to the management of the spinoff, • Difference in industry profitability: The absolute value of difference between the median ratio of operating profit to total assets ratio in the parent and spinoff firms' industries. 10 When parent and spinoff firm industries have similar profitability profiles, insiders are more likely to possess valuable firm-specific human capital. Table 6 presents our findings. Overall, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that outsiders are more often part of spinoff top management teams when firm-specific human capital is less valuable. Over 90% of spinoffs in which an outsider is part of top management are cross industry spinoffs, a significantly higher percentage than that of remaining sample spinoffs. In addition, the absolute value of the difference between parent and spinoff industry profitability is significantly larger for spinoffs with outsider managers than it is for other spinoffs (at the .10 level).
Our evidence weakly supports the hypothesis that when firm-specific human capital is more valuable, an overlap between spinoff and parent top management is more likely. Only 78% of straddler spinoffs are cross industry, and this percentage is lower than that for other spinoffs (at the .10 level). The industry homogeneity variable is never significantly different across classifications.
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Parrino proxies for industry homogeneity using the average partial correlation coefficient between a firm's stock returns and an index of industry stock returns for all firms in a 2-digit SIC code using monthly data from January 1970 through December 1988. Each industry member firm's common stock return is regressed on that industry's return index as well as the equally weighted market return index. The partial correlation coefficients of firms in an industry are then averaged. A minimum of 35 industry members are required to derive the index. Because the partial correlation coefficient is negatively related to the number of firms in constructing the industry return index, Parrino places an upper bound of 50 on industry members, drawing the sample of 50 randomly when an industry has more than 50 firms.
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Operating profit to total assets is computed prior to depreciation. Industry adjustments are made by subtracting a pure play performance benchmark from the firm's actual profitability. Pure play performance benchmarks are computed by multiplying the median performance of pure play firms in the same industry by a weight based on the sample firm's book value of assets in that industry based on its segment data. These products are then summed across segments for each sample firm. Industry is defined as the same 4-digit SIC code. If there are fewer than five pure play firms in an SIC code, a lower-level SIC code is used until a match is found with five pure plays. 
Composition of spinoff top management and the value created at announcement
As stated earlier, we hypothesize that the way in which top management is restructured is related to the value created in a spinoff. The alternative hypothesis is that management team characteristics are unrelated to value creation, either because management team structure doesn't matter, or because each firm optimizes the structure of its top management team and the value created is not systematically related to the characteristics of the optimal management team.
We use the parent firm's standardized cumulative abnormal return over days -1 and 0 relative to announcement as our measure of value created, and regress this variable on dummy variables characterizing the top management structure of the spinoff firm and appropriate control variables.
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Our estimated average two-day abnormal return around announcement for the entire sample is 3.58%, which falls well within the range of previously published figures. As mentioned earlier, not all spinoffs elicit a positive response at announcement. For our sample, the range of two day abnormal returns runs from -12.5% to 42.0%.
As described below, regression results support the hypothesis that the characteristics of the spinoff top management team are associated with the value created at announcement. We are careful, however, not to attribute causality to the explanatory variables included in our regression.
Rather, our interpretation is that value creation differs across spinoff transactions in a way that varies systematically with the characteristics of top management structure.
The two-day abnormal return is determined by running the market model for each parent firm. The model is estimated over days -150 through -31 relative to announcement. The CRSP equal-weighted market index is used as the independent variable. Standardized abnormal returns represent a normalization of the two-day abnormal return based on the historical variance of returns for individual firms. They are computed following the method developed in Dodd and Warner (1983 
Defining management classification variables and relating them to hypotheses
To capture the salient aspects of the composition of spinoff firms top management teams, we define a set of dummy variables to use as explanatory variables in our regressions. The dummy variables correspond to the classifications developed in table 5 and summarized in figure 1. A set of non-mutually exclusive dummy variables is used for most regression models, but to test whether or not intersections between classifications are important, we also use a set of mutually exclusive variables.
A top insider dummy variable, which equals one if a parent firm top manager is part of the spinoff top management team and zero otherwise, is included. It allow us to test the hypothesis that the presence of these managers, with their valuable firm-specific human capital and governance expertise, is associated with value creation. Top insiders fall into one of two subcategories, straddlers and top insider jumps ship, depending on whether or not the insider retains a top position at the parent firm following the spinoff. A dummy variable is created for each of these subcategories.
The straddler dummy variable allows us to test the hypothesis that overlapping management structures between parent and spinoff firms are associated with value creation. Overlap is valuable, for example, if parent firm top managers are strong and/or have valuable firm-specific human capital. Alternatively, if straddling signals little or no substantive change in the way the firms are managed, straddler variables will be negatively associated with value creation. As mentioned earlier, straddling can have a governance-oriented overlap or an operating-oriented overlap. Thus, we define dummy variables for these subcategories as follows: governance straddlers equals one if the spinoff chairman is also chairman at the post-spinoff parent, and zero otherwise, top operating manager straddlers equal to one if the spinoff top operating managers (CEO or President) is also a post-spinoff top operating manager (CEO or President), and zero otherwise. These variables allow us to test whether governance-oriented and/or operating overlaps are associated with value creation.
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A top insider jumps ship dummy is included to examine whether a chairman or top manager departing from the parent, or jumping ship, is associated with value creation for shareholders. The variable's coefficient will be positive if it signals strong prospects for the spinoff firm, or if it resolves a mismatch between management skills and firm assets. The latter could include the departure of a weak manager, who will now manage a smaller set of assets. Alternatively, the variable's coefficient will be negative if it signals weak prospects for the parent firm, or exacerbates an existing management problem. For example, a strong manager might choose to jump ship to work at a smaller, but more promising spinoff, leaving the parent firm to with inferior management.
An outsider dummy is included to test the hypothesis that an outsider brings valuable skills to the management team. If this is the case, then the outsider dummy will have a positive coefficient.
Alternatively, the presence of an outsider might signal weakness in the incumbent management team or be an indication that no inside manager is willing to take on the management of the spinoff firm.
If this is the case the coefficient will be negative.
Control variables are also included in our regression models. The primary control variables are the relative size of the spinoff and whether or not the spinoff transaction increases the focus of the parent company. Prior research finds that the cross-sectional variation in the announcement period abnormal stock return is positively associated with the size of the spinoff relative to the size of the parent 12 and whether the spinoff is "cross industry" or "increases focus." 13 Including these variables allows us to determine whether our top management variables have incremental explanatory power.
Two additional dummy variables are included to control for whether a spinoff is undertaken to facilitate a merger of the parent and whether a parent is undertaking multiple simultaneous spinoffs.
12
Attempts to explain cross-sectional variation in parent firms' announcement day returns document that larger spinoffs (relative to the size of the parent) are associated with more positive abnormal performance (Hite and Owers (1983) , Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) , Schipper and Smith (1983), and Johnson, Brown and Johnson (1994) ).
13
Daley, Mehrotra and Sivakumar (1997).
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Presuming that the characteristics of our sample are similar to those used in other studies, we expect the sign of the coefficients for relative size and the focus dummy to be positive. If parent firm mergers carry an acquisition premium whose magnitude is signaled in the spinoff announcement, we expect the sign on the merger dummy to be positive. We have no prediction for the sign of the other control variable. Table 7 presents the results of our cross-sectional regressions.
Testing hypotheses about value creation and top management team composition
14 The first model (1) In the third model (3), we separate top insiders into the straddlers and top insider jumps ship categories. As hypothesized earlier, straddling and jumping ship might reflect differing economic situations that affect the market's assessment of the spinoff. In this model, the management 14 When a parent firm announces that more than one spinoff will occur simultaneously, we include one observation for each spinoff firm. Thus, several of our announcement period abnormal returns are included multiple times as dependent variables, and hence the observations are not independent. To address this issue, we include a dummy variable as described above, and employ robust regression analysis. Robust regression explicitly allows for correlated errors across parent firms' simultaneous spinoffs. Coefficient estimates are identical to those produced by ordinary least squares regression, but statistical tests are computed using consistent estimates of standard errors. In our sample, six parent firms undertake two spinoffs simultaneously, and one parent undertakes three spinoffs simultaneously.
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Adjusted R 2 s are not routinely produced from robust estimation procedures. Adjusted R 2 s for the OLS models corresponding to models (1) through (5) are 11.5%, 14.3%, 18.1%, 18.3%, and 20.5%, respectively.
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variables as a group enter significantly as the .01 level. Of the individual variables, two enter the model significantly. They are the top insider jumps ship and the division head variables. The top insider jumps ship variable has a positive and significant coefficient. The division head variable coefficient is also positive and significant, but is smaller in magnitude than the coefficient of the top insider jumps ship dummy (1.04 versus 1.88). Note that both of these management categories involve managers leaving the parent firm. The relatively high value creation associated with these spinoffs could be the result of positive signals about the prospects of the spinoff firm. On the other hand, they could be a positive response to the removal of these managers and the associated assets from the parent firm. We explore these possibilities further in later sections.
The straddler dummy variable is not significant in model (3). This could be due to the fact that different types of overlap are associated different value effects. As explained earlier, operating overlap indicates that a single top manager is splitting his time between two publicly traded firms-a situation that might be poorly received if the manager does not have the capacity to handle both jobs. It is more likely, however, that governance overlap would be effective. Thus, in model (4), we split the straddler categories into two subcategories: governance straddlers and operating straddlers.
Again, management variables as a group are significant (p-value of .015). While the coefficients of the straddler variables are not significant, they carry opposite signs (positive for governance and negative for operating) as suggested by the forgoing discussion.
As is illustrated in figure 1 , there are intersections between our management team classifications.
For example, division heads are paired with straddlers in 27 spinoffs. Thus, models (2) through (4) do not allow us to test for differences in value creation associated with certain combinations of managers. For example, spinoff firms managed only by division heads and other lower level managers may lack critical governance expertise and top management experience, while the combination of a division head and a top insider might effectively combine firm-specific human capital with governance expertise. To address this issue, model (5) makes use of the mutually exclusive categories of top management that correspond to the diagonal elements of figure 1 as well
as four other mutually exclusive subgroups (a division head with a straddler, a division head with a top insider jumping ship, an outsider with a top insider, and a division head with an outsider).
In model (5), the management variables as a group are again highly significant (p-value of .001).
The combination of a division head with a top manager who jumps ship carries a strongly positive coefficient of 2.47. Spinoffs whose management team is comprised only of top managers that jump are also positively associated with value creation (coefficient=1.28). Notice that the division head/jumps ship combination is likely to provide a strong combination of firm-specific human capital and governance expertise. It is also a combination in which both managers leave the parent firm, and so is possibly a form of management dismissal.
Finally, it is worth noting that the outsider dummy is not significant in any of our models. This lack of significance could be a result of our definition of an outsider. According to our definition, an outsider could have arrived at the firm as many as three years prior to the spinoff. Hence, the market is likely to have impounded the relevant information into stock prices prior to announcement. Univariate analysis (not presented here) shows that the average abnormal return at the announcements of an outsider spinoff is slightly positive and not significantly different from zero. Because the average response for this subsample is not negative, the insignificant regression coefficient seems more likely due to an expectations problem than a negative signal.
Multinomial logit analysis of spinoff top manager classifications
Thus far, we have demonstrated that the value created at announcement is systematically related to certain top management team characteristics. Absent, however, is statistical evidence relating parent firm performance and transaction characteristics to the structure of a spinoff firm's top management team. Because our management classifications are multiple and categorical, we use multinomial logit regression to conduct this analysis. Our dependent variable reflects four categories of spinoff top manager: straddler, top insider jumps ship, outsider, and division head. The Multinomial logit models are estimated relative to a base category. For the model presented here, division heads form the base category, so parameter estimates are interpreted relative to this group. Our explanatory variables are selected based on results from prior studies of management turnover, prior studies of spinoffs and our findings in previous sections of this paper. Our small sample size makes parsimony a necessity. Accordingly, we model the choice of spinoff top manager as a function of the following variables, as defined previously unless otherwise indicated:
• Chairman dummy, Equals one if the manager associated with an observation is the chairman or the chairman/top manager, and zero otherwise, • Industry homogeneity index,
• Cross industry dummy,
• Parent industry profitability less spinoff industry profitability, the difference between the median ratio of operating profit to total assets ratio in the parent and spinoff firms' industries for years -2 and -1 relative to the spinoff announcement,
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• Pre-spinoff market-adjusted stock return, Cumulative stock return adjusted for market movements measured for months [-13 through -1] relative to announcement; the market benchmark is the CRSP equallyweighted market index, • Relative size of spinoff firm,
• Pre-spinoff industry-adjusted market-to-book for parent firm, averaged over years -2 and -1 relative to announcement, 16 Clearly, this creates interdependencies across observations. We control for this by assigning all interdependent observations to a group or cluster. If, for example, a spinoff firm has two top managers one of whom is a division head and one who straddles, then these two observations will be assigned to the same cluster. In estimating the model, standard errors and the variance-covariance matrix are adjusted to take the interdependencies within clusters into account. Coefficient estimates are unaffected.
Operating profit to total assets is computed prior to depreciation. Industry adjustments are made by subtracting a pure play performance benchmark from the firm's actual profitability. Pure play performance benchmarks are computed by multiplying the median performance of pure play firms in the same industry by a weight based on the sample firm's book value of assets in that industry based on its segment data. These products are then summed across segments for each sample firm. Industry is defined as the same 4-digit SIC code. If there are fewer than five pure play firms in an SIC code, a lower-level SIC code is used until a match is found with five pure plays. Data from each firm's industry for years -2 and -1 relative to announcement are averaged, then the difference it taken, then median of the difference is taken across transactions. 
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• Industry-adjusted profitability for parent firm, averaged over years -2 to -1 relative to announcement. For straddlers, three variables enter the model significantly: the chairman dummy, the industry homogeneity index, and the relative size of the spinoff. The chairman dummy indicates that individuals holding the title of spinoff chairman (alone or with another title) are more likely to straddle firms than individuals without the chairman title. This is consistent with the evidence presented in table 5 which showed that the preponderance of management overlap is governanceoriented. The change in probability of 0.25 means that relative to division heads (the base category), the chairman or chairman/top manager has a 25% higher probability of straddling the two top management teams.
The industry homogeneity index has a significant negative coefficient for straddlers. This implies that the more homogeneous the spinoff industry, the less likely a top manager will hold positions at both firms (relative to division heads). When industry homogeneity is high, it is more likely that the parent firm can accurately assess a spinoff firm's potential and the quality of a new management team. Accordingly, the value of establishing an overlapping management structure, for example, to monitor and influence decision-making, is relatively low.
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A description of this approach can be found in Long (1997). The change in probability of Outcome i can be written mathematically as:
where sk is the sample standard deviation of independent variable xk. Thus, ∆Pr is the change in probability associated with a change in the value of the explanatory variable from -1/2 standard deviation below the mean to 1/2 standard deviation above the mean. For dummy variables, such as the cross industry dummy, ∆Pr is the change in probability associated with a movement from 0 to 1. Finally, the coefficient on relative size is positive and significant for straddlers. This indicates that straddler spinoffs are larger than division head spinoffs. If larger firms are more difficult to manage and govern, then deploying the firm-specific capital and governance expertise of straddlers will be valuable. Alternatively, straddling may occur in larger spinoffs because parent top managers are more reluctant to sever ties. The parent's prior performance is a significant determinant in the appointment of an outsider to spinoff top management. In general, the better the parent performs, whether measured relative to the spinoff industry, the stock market, or relative to the parent industry, the less likely an outsider will be named to head up the spinoff. Conversely, the poorer the parent's prior performance, the more likely the parent firm will appoint an outsider to lead the spinoff. Poor performance suggests that parent firm managers do not possess the skills or expertise necessary to manage the spinoff firm. The probability of selecting an outsider is most sensitive to the industry-adjusted profitability of the parent firm in the year prior to the spinoff announcement (∆Pr = -0.160).
For insiders jumping ship, only two variables are statistically significant: the chairman dummy, and the cross industry dummy. The positive coefficient on the chairman dummy indicates that managers jumping ship are more likely to hold the chairman title than division managers. Arguably a lesser title would be tantamount to a demotion. The variable with the largest effect on probabilities is the cross industry dummy (∆Pr = -0.170). Its negative coefficient is consistent with insiders staying in an industry where they have valuable human capital. Equivalently, a division head is more likely to be named a top manager when the spinoff and parent firms are in different industries.
Ownership and governance structure of spinoff firms
In prior sections, we focus on the structure of spinoff firms' top management teams. Two critical determinants of the incentives of top management to maximize value are the firm's ownership and governance structure. If the objective of a spinoff is to create value through Table 9 , panel A presents evidence on spinoff firms' ownership structure, while panel B presents evidence on their governance structure. Data are collected from spinoff firm proxy statements and supplemented by other public documents and press reports as available and necessary. The data show that spinoff firms have more tightly concentrated ownership structures than the typical publicly traded firm. This includes larger holdings by both insiders (officers and directors) and outside blockholders. The mean (median) holdings of officers and directors is 14.7% (8.3%). This is higher than benchmarks of typical insider holdings. For example, in a sample of more than 1,000 Value Line firms, Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) find that mean (median) holdings by officers and directors are 10.8% (6.3%). This is consistent with spinoffs providing stronger management and director incentives than a typical publicly traded firm.
A substantial fraction of spinoff firms, 73.8%, have a 5% or greater outside blockholder.
Holdings of outside blockholders are 23.7% on average and 18.0% at the median. In the Denis et al.
sample, only 46.2% of firms have outside blockholders, and their ownership stake is smaller (18.1% on average, and 14.8% at the median). In 11.3% of spinoff firms, the former parent is a 5% or greater blockholder. It is unclear whether these blocks should be classified as inside or outside.
Examining governance structure variables (panel B) shows that the typical spinoff firm has a small board of directors (6 members) where outsiders hold more than half the seats (60% at the median). Again, this stands in contrast to benchmarks from other studies. For example, in the Denis et al. sample, the median board size is 11 members and median outsider percentage is 50%. The median spinoff has no past or current parent employees on it board of directors. On average, 19 We do not present evidence on changes in parent firm's governance structure. This is because an exploratory data collection effort revealed that there is little, if any, substantive change in parent firms' top management in the year following the spinoff other than that resulting from parent managers joining the spinoff firm. Examining ownership and governance structure by categories of spinoff top management teams, shows that division head spinoffs have lower insider ownership than other spinoffs (11.1% on average and 3.8% at the median), while straddler spinoffs have higher insider ownership (21.4% on average and 14.9% at the median). One explanation for these findings is that the creation of optimal management incentives requires a higher percentage of insider ownership at straddler spinoffs. If the management overlap at straddlers creates potential agency problems, for example, a greater equity stake might be required to mitigate them. Alternatively, it is possible that division heads are in a weaker bargaining position when the spinoff is structured and can thus negotiate only a relatively small equity stake. In contrast, because straddlers are on the top management team of both firms, they are likely to be in a position to extract a larger equity stake.
The primary difference in governance structures across spinoff top management categories is that parent directors are most prominent in spinoffs where a division head is a top manager. This additional evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that, due to division managers' lack of governance expertise and top management experience, they are likely to be paired with parent firm top managers or outsiders. Earlier, we showed that this held for spinoff firms' top management team. Here it is reflected in spinoff governance structure as well.
Management dismissal and the allocation of assets to spinoff firms
Our above findings raise the question of whether managers that leave the parent firm, particularly top insiders that jump ship, are being dismissed. If some spinoffs serve as mechanisms for management dismissal, it is unlikely that the firm's most productive assets are allocated to the new firm. To test this, we compare the pre-spinoff profitability and valuation of the parent firm with an "as-if" firm constructed using a weighted average of parent and spinoff firm data after the spinoff transaction not taken place, and is constructed by computing the asset-weighted average of parent and spinoff firm statistics. We also examine parent and spinoff profitability separately.
Results for all spinoff transactions
Table 10 presents industry-adjusted profitability and industry-adjusted valuation discounts or premia before and after the spinoff. Recall that over the two years prior to the spinoff announcement, parent firms exhibit strong profitability, but are valued at a discount relative to an industry benchmark. The "as-if" measure shows that over the two years following the spinoff, profitability remains strong. The valuation discount, however, falls from -12.2% to -6.8%, but is still significantly negative. Thus, the valuation of assets improves on average following a spinoff, but remains below that of industry peers.
Examining parent and spinoff firms separately shows that the valuation improvement for "as-if" firms is entirely attributable to parents. Following the spinoff, parent firms maintain strong profitability (.049) and suffer no significant discount in market-to-book or valuation. In contrast, spinoff firms have profitability at par with industry peers, but have industry-adjusted market-to-book ratios that are significantly lower than the industry (-.207) and suffer substantial valuation discounts (-21.9%) . 20 Differences between parent and spinoff firm profitability and valuation are consistent with parent firms allocating weak assets to spinoff firms. While this seems to solve parent firms' performance difficulties, managers of the spinoff firm face a formidable challenge.
Our findings on parent firms support the prior evidence on the value of corporate focus, but our findings on spinoff firms seem to contradict it. There is substantial evidence that unfocused firms suffer a valuation discount (Berger and Ofek (1995, 1996) , Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Comment and Jarrell (1995 ) Lang and Stulz (1994 ), and Servaes (1996 Daley, Mehrota and Sivakumar (1997) ). Following a spinoff transaction, both the parent and spinoff firms are more focused-each is smaller and is typically less diversified. However, while increased focus is associated with the elimination of a valuation discount for parent firms, spinoff firms are substantially discounted. Thus, increasing focus does not "resolve" the pre-transaction valuation discount suffered by the parent firm's assets. Rather, spinoff transactions are structured in a way that allocates weak assets to the spinoff firm and reduces the valuation discount attributable to parent firms' remaining assets. 
Results by categories of spinoff top management teams
Prior to the spinoff, parent firms in all top management team categories have strong profitability relative to industry peers. Pre-spinoff valuation discounts, however, differ across categories. Specifically, only two categories-straddlers and division heads-suffer significant discounts. Parents of straddler spinoffs have a pre-spinoff industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio of -.267 and a valuation discount of -15.8%. Parents of division head spinoffs have similar characteristics, industry-adjusted market-to-book of -.221 and a valuation discount of -16.7%.
Interestingly, these are the only categories in which significant valuation discounts appear in the "asif" measures after the spinoff-although the "as-if" measures are smaller than the pre-spinoff discounts. Thus, it appears that for parents with valuation discounts prior to the spinoff, the transaction is associated with a reduction of the discount, but not its elimination.
All categories of spinoff firms have significantly negative market-to-book ratios and valuation discounts. Interestingly, spinoff firms in the two categories that involve a manager departing from the parent firm-division heads and top insider jumps ship-have the lowest industry-adjusted marktto-book (-.197 for division heads and -.303 for jumps ship) and the largest valuation discounts takeover targets.
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In addition, many of our spinoff and parent firms have only one reported business segment on Compustat, making them "pure play firms" by the Berger/Ofek (1995) definition. Our findings demonstrate that even "pure plays" can trade at a discount, particularly since the choice to report a single business segment is only a proxy for the degree of diversification. Removing single segment spinoff firms firms from our analysis does not -19 .3% for division heads and -27.7% for jumps ship). This evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that managers go with the spinoff because its assets are strong and managers want to go with them. It is consistent, however, with the hypothesis that managers are not leaving voluntarily.
The spinoff could be a way to jettison a manager along with a weak set of assets.
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Conclusions
Corporate spinoffs are complex transactions that entail the simultaneous restructuring of assets and top management. As such, spinoffs provide an opportunity to examine how the economics of a firm are related to the way in which its top management team is structured. Economic theory predicts that the structure of a top management team should take into account factors such as the value of firm-specific human capital, the value of more general human capital such as governance expertise and top management experience, and the role of the firm's governance and ownership structure in aligning the incentives of managers and shareholders. Empirical work in this area is challenging as the data available to test the predictions of theory are limited and sometimes gross. In addition, complementarities between these factors make isolating the marginal contribution of a single factor difficult.
Nevertheless, in this paper we establish that firm-specific human capital, governance expertise and top management experience affect the composition of spinoff firms' top management, that the structure of spinoff top management is related to the value created by a spinoff, and that for a subsample of firms, spinoffs sometimes constitute a form of management dismissal, with the opportunity to manage a smaller, weaker firm serving as a "consolation prize" for managers leaving the parent firm.
affect the results.
22
Removing spinoffs undertaken to facilitate mergers of the parent firm, where we might expect managers to be more likely to leave the parent, from our analysis does not qualitatively affect our results.
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Our results provide new evidence on the factors influencing top management appointments.
Thus we contribute to the literature on top management changes, which to date has emphasized the process of management dismissal over the process of management appointment. Additional work on how managers are selected to fill empty positions and how top management teams are structured seems a useful area for future research. Our findings also establish a new link between the literature on asset restructuring and the literature on management changes. Further study of the restructuring of top management (or lack thereof) that accompanies asset restructurings should deepen our understanding of when and how asset restructurings create value and when and how they destroy it. A spinoff transaction is not included in the sample under the following circumstances: the percentage spun off is less than 80%, the spinoff firm already has publicly traded stock, the parent is not a public company, or the spinoff was mandated by regulatory authorities. Relative value is firm value of the spinoff firm divided by the pre-spinoff firm value of the parent firm. Firm value is defined as the sum of the market value of common stock, the book value of preferred stock and the book value of total debt. Parent firm value is measured at the end of the last fiscal year prior to announcement. Spinoff firm value is measured at the end of the first fiscal year following the spinoff.
Year
Number of spinoffs % of sample Table 2 Frequency distribution of reported reasons for undertaking a spinoff transaction and parent performance and valuation prior to the spinoff.
Sample of completed spinoffs announced between 1985 and 1995. In panel A, sources for reported reasons are The Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones News Wire. A single parent firm reports as many as three categories of reasons for undertaking the spinoff. Thus, the total number of reasons reported is greater than the total number of spinoffs. In panel B, pre-transaction performance is measured using all available data from years -2 to -1 relative to announcement. The mean is taken for each sample firm, then the median is computed across firms. Annual market adjusted buy and hold stock returns are constructed using CRSP monthly returns and the equally-weighted market index; medians presented. In computing market to book ratios, market value is defined as the sum of the market value of equity, the book value of debt and the book value of preferred stock. Industry adjustments are made by subtracting a pure play performance benchmark from the firm's actual performance or valuation measure. Pure play performance benchmarks are computed by multiplying the median performance of pure play firms in the same industry by a weight based on the sample firm's sales or the book value of assets in that industry based on its segment data. These products are then summed across segments for each sample firm. Industry is defined as the same 4-digit SIC code. If there are fewer than five pure play firms in an SIC code, a lower-level SIC code is used until a match is found with five pure plays. Valuation discounts are computed in a similar fashion following the method of Berger and Ofek (1995) . Market adjusted buy and hold return year -2 relative to announcement -4.68%
Market adjusted buy and hold return year -1 relative to announcement -0.27%
Market-to-book ratio
Unadjusted .937
Adjusted for industry -.176***
Valuation premium or discount relative to pure play benchmark (%)
Based on value-to-sales multiples -13.0%*** Based on value-to-asset multiples -12.2%*** ***,**,* significantly different from zero at the .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively. Table 3 Ownership structure changes for parent firms around the time of a spinoff transaction.
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Sample of parent firms of completed spinoffs announced between 1985 and 1995. Ownership and governance structure information is collected from Compact Disclosure. Outside blockholders are defined as owners of 5% or more of the firm's common stock that are not related to top management and do not own shares over which managers have voting authority. Percentage of shares held by outside blockholders is based on holders of 5% or more of the firm's common stock as reported in the proxy statement. Figures presented are  means, The spinoff top management team is defined as the top two spinoff firm managers. They hold a combination of the titles chairman, chief executive officer (CEO), and president. Insiders are managers with "long" tenure at the parent firm are defined as managers whose tenure at the parent firm is three years or longer. Outsiders and managers with "short" tenure at the parent firm are managers who worked at a company other than the parent firm prior to the spinoff or managers who worked at the parent firm for less than three years prior to the spinoff. Division or headquarters executives are managers holding one or more of the following titles at the parent firm prior to the spinoff: Division CEO, Division (a) There are 8 individuals for whom there is insufficient information regarding their previous employment. Of those 8, 6 are spinoff chairmen in two person teams and two are spinoff presidents in on two person teams. (b) Of these 83 firms, the management teams are composed as follows: in 44 firms (53%) both individuals have "long" tenure at the parent firm, in 27 firms (32.5%) one individual has "long" tenure with the parent firm and one individual is from the outside or has "short" tenure at the parent firm, in 6 firms (7.2%) both individuals are outsiders or have "short" tenure at the parent firm, and in 6 firms (7.2%) this information is not available. (c) Of the 43 firms, the management teams are composed as follows: in 31 firms (72.1%) both individuals have "long" tenure at the parent firm, in 9 firms (20.9%) one individual has "long" tenure with the parent firm and one individual is from the outside or has "short" tenure at the parent firm, in 1 firm (2.3%) both individuals are outsiders or have "short" tenure at the parent firm, and in 2 firms (4.7%) this information is not available. (d) Of these 75 firms, the management teams are composed as follows: in 44 firms (58.7%) both individuals have "long" tenure at the parent firm, in 27 firms (36.0%) one individual has "long" tenure with the parent firm and one individual is from the outside or has "short" tenure at the parent firm, in 4 firms (5.3%) one individual has "long" tenure at the parent firm and information about the other individual is not available. (e) Of these 42 firms, the management teams are composed as follows: in 31 firms (73.8%) both individuals have "long" tenure at the parent firm, in 9 firms (21.4%) one individual has "long" tenure with the parent firm and one individual is from the outside or has "short" tenure at the parent firm, in 2 firms (4.8%) one individual has "long" tenure at the parent firm and information about the other individual is not available.
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October 2001 Eric G. Wruck and Karen H. Wruck Table 5 Top management team composition and classifications for spinoff firms.
Sample of 172 completed spinoff transactions announced between 1985 and 1995. The spinoff top management team is defined as the top two spinoff firm managers. They hold a combination of the titles chairman, chief executive officer (CEO), and president. Insiders are managers with "long" tenure at the parent firm are defined as managers whose tenure at the parent firm is three years or longer. Outsiders and managers with "short" tenure at the parent firm are managers who worked at a company other than the parent firm prior to the spinoff or managers who worked at the parent firm for less than three years prior to the spinoff. Division or headquarters executives are managers holding one or more of the following titles at the parent firm prior to the spinoff: Division CEO, Division President, Group President, Division General Manager, Group Vice President, Group General Manager, Chief Financial Officer, Vice President, Executive Vice President, or Senior Vice President. Data on the two top executives for each spinoff firm are collected from proxy statements, annual reports, Dow Jones On-Line Publications, and Lotus One Source. The one or two top executives are defined as the executives at the spinoff firm holding a combination of the titles chairman, chief executive officer (CEO), and president.
Number This figure is to be read in a fashion similar to a correlation matrix. Cells contain number and row percentages. Adding up the numbers along the main diagonal and those above the main diagonal to the right (or below the main diagonal to the left) equals 170, the total number of spinoff firms with complete top management data. Adding up the numbers across categories of spinoff top manager (the far left column) or equivalently the numbers in all the cells equals 248. Forty-eight of the diagonal elements are two-person teams; thus 296 (= 248 + 48) spinoff top managers fall into one of the four categories for spinoff firms with complete top management data. There are more managers than spinoff firms. Each individual manager can fall into only one category, while spinoff firms with two top managers can fall into two categories. All off-diagonal cells represent two person top management teams. Main diagonal cells capture one and two person management teams with only one category of top manager. Categories of top managers are defined as follows: top insider straddles indicates that a parent chairman or top manager joins spinoff top management and retains a top position with parent firm following the transaction, top insider jumps ship indicates that a parent chairman or top manager joins spinoff top management and maintains no employment relationship with the parent firm following the transaction, division heads indicates that a parent firm division head or lower level executive takes a top position at spinoff, outsiders indicates that there is at least one outsider on the spinoff top management team. Parrino (1997) and is the average partial correlation coefficient between a firm's stock returns and an index of industry stock returns for all firms in a 2-digit SIC code. Industry classifications for spinoff and parent firms are based on 4-digit historical SIC codes from the CRSP database; where CRSP SIC codes are not available, Compustat primary SIC codes are used. Profitability is operating profit before depreciation divided by total assets. The absolute value of the difference in industry profitability is measured the year prior to announcement. Sample of 298 spinoff top executives spanning 172 completed spinoff transactions announced between 1985 and 1995. The dependent variable is a categorical variable denoting the choice of spinoff top managers. The four possible outcomes are Division Head (base case), Straddler (spinoff top manager holds top position at the former parent following the spinoff), Outsider (spinoff top manager brought in from outside the parent firm), and Top Insider Jumps Ship (spinoff top manager left top position at the parent firm). The spinoff top manager choice is modeled with a multinomial logit model using robust variance methods. Reported are the change in probability due to a one-standard deviation change in the independent variable around its mean, holding all other independent variables at their respective means, the estimated coefficient, and p-value. The sample mean of each independent variable and its standard deviation are also presented. Relative size is the ratio of spinoff firm value at the end of the first fiscal year following completion relative to parent firm value at the end of the fiscal year prior to announcement. Firm value is the sum of the book value of debt, the book value of preferred stock and the market value of equity. The Chairman dummy is one if the spinoff top manager is the chairman or chairman/top operating manager, otherwise the dummy is zero and denotes the "number 2" member of the top management team. A spinoff is defined as or cross-industry if the parent and spinoff firms are in different four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Historical CRSP SIC codes are used to define industry; where CRSP SIC codes are not available, Compustat primary SIC codes are used. Industry homogeneity is taken from Parrino (1997). Market-adjusted stock return is constructed using CRSP monthly returns and the equally-weighted market index for the one year ending one month prior to the spinoff announcement. Industry-adjusted market-to-book value and industry-adjusted profitability are the difference between the parent firm's actual performance and a pure play performance benchmark. Pure play performance benchmarks are computed by multiplying the median performance of pure play firms in the same industry by the sample firm's sales or the book value of assets, as appropriate, in that industry based on segment data. These products are then summed across segments for each sample firm. Industry is defined as the same 4-digit SIC code. If there are fewer than 5 pure play firms in an SIC code, a lower-level SIC code is used until a match is found with 5 pure plays. Profitability is operating profit before depreciation over total assets. The difference between parent industry and spinoff industry profitability is based on years -2 and -1. The mean is taken for each sample firm's industry, then the median is computed across firms. Table 9 Ownership and governance structure of spinoff firms.
Parent firm industry
Sample of completed spinoffs announced between 1985 and 1995. Ownership and governance structure information is collected from spinoff firm proxy statements and supplemented by other public documents and press reports as necessary. Outside blockholders are defined as owners of 5% or more of the firm's common stock that are not related to top management and do not own shares over which managers have voting authority. Percentage of shares held by outside blockholders is based on holders of 5% or more of the firm's common stock as reported in the proxy statement. Parent blockholder is defined as the spinoff firm's former parent organization. Insiders are defined as managers of the spinoff firm or their relations. Parent directors are current or past parent employees who are not employed as managers of the spinoff firm. Outsiders on the board are directors who are not managers, relatives of managers or current or past employees of the parent firm. Figures presented are means, Table 10 Profitability and valuation prior to and following the spinoff transaction for "as-if," parent and spinoff firms.
Sample of completed spinoffs announced between 1985 and 1995. Performance is measured using all available data from years -2 to 2 relative to announcement. The median is taken for each sample firm, then the median is computed across firms. Operating profit is prior to depreciation. In computing market-to-book ratios, market value is defined as the sum of the market value of equity, the book value of debt and the book value of preferred stock. Industry adjustments are made by subtracting a pure play performance benchmark from the firm's actual performance or valuation measure. Pure play performance benchmarks are computed by multiplying the median performance of pure play firms in the same industry by a weight based on the sample firm's sales or the book value of assets in that industry based on its segment data. These products are then summed across segments for each sample firm. Industry is defined as the same 4-digit SIC code. If there are fewer than five pure play firms in an SIC code, a lowerlevel SIC code is used until a match is found with five pure plays. Valuation discounts are computed in a similar fashion following the method of Berger and Ofek (1995) Valuation discount or premium -5.0% -9.3% -3.3% -17.9% *** *** denotes significance at the .01 level, ** denotes significance at the .05 level, * denotes significance at the .10 level. NA denotes not applicable.
